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THIRD PARTY CONSENT AND CONTAINER SEARCHES
IN THE HOME
Harlan Thomas Mechling*
Abstract: Circuit courts disagree as to whether law enforcement officers have a duty to
inquire about a resident’s actual authority to consent to searches of ambiguous containers in a
common area. Two circuit courts use the ambiguity approach and two circuit courts use the
obviousness approach. The ambiguity approach articulated by the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Peyton provides protection for individuals’ rights while placing a minimal burden
on law enforcement officers. In Peyton, the D.C. Circuit held that law enforcement officers
have a duty to ask clarifying questions if ownership over a container is ambiguous. The
ambiguity approach advanced by the Peyton court is a well-balanced approach to handling
third party consent cases. The obviousness approach, which allows officers to search any
containers that do not obviously belong to someone other than the consenting party, gives too
much power to police and may infringe on the absent tenant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. The ambiguity approach is superior to the obviousness approach, but to properly
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should adopt a bright-line rule
requiring law enforcement officers to inquire before searching any container in a common
area, regardless of the level of ambiguity. This solution will reduce the administrative costs
of case-by-case inquiry into the amorphous concept of ambiguity and advance the common
law tradition of protecting the privacy of individuals in their home.

INTRODUCTION
Davon Peyton, a young adult, lives in a one-bedroom apartment with
his grandmother.1 Both Peyton and his grandmother are on the lease—
she lives in the bedroom, and Peyton lives in a corner of the living
room.2 The police suspect Peyton has something illegal in the apartment,
but they do not have a search warrant or even probable cause to request
one.3 One day, when the police know that Peyton is not home, officers
knock on the door and ask Peyton’s grandmother if they can search the

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Mary Fan for her guidance and effort in editing this comment. I would also like to thank the
Washington Law Review for its countless hours of work on this Comment.
1. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In the district court, Peyton
referred to his grandmother as “grandmother” and “great-grandmother.” In the Circuit Court, Peyton
used the term “great-great-grandmother.” See id. at 558 n.1 (Henderson, K., dissenting).
2. Id. at 549.
3. Id.
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apartment.4 She consents to a search but warns the police that Peyton
keeps his private possessions near the bed in the living room. 5 The
police ignore the warning and proceed to search Peyton’s space and
personal belongings.6
Like Peyton and his grandmother, millions of American adults share a
living space with intermingled possessions, making it critically
important that American residents have clear rules governing the
searches of shared living spaces and containers therein.7 These searches
implicate a judicially created rule known as the “apparent authority
doctrine,” which permits law enforcement officers to rely on the consent
of a person they reasonably believe has authority over the premises.8
However, the circuit courts have developed different approaches to
applying the apparent authority doctrine to searches of containers in a
home. Thus, the outcome of Peyton’s case may differ depending on
which court hears the case.
Fortunately for Peyton, his case was heard by the D.C. Circuit in
United States v. Peyton.9 Applying the ambiguity approach, the court
held that the police officers’ conduct violated the apparent authority
doctrine. The court explained that Peyton’s grandmother’s warning
created sufficient ambiguity to make it unreasonable for the police to
assume her consent extended to Peyton’s personal belongings.10 In
contrast, the Second and Seventh Circuits apply the obviousness
approach.11 Under this standard, the search would have been proper
because the area searched did not have clear signs of Peyton’s
ownership, such as a label, that would require the police to conclude that
it obviously did not belong to the grandmother.12

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 549–50.
7. Camille Salama, More American Households Doubling Up as Rents Rise, ZILLOW (Oct. 10,
2014), http://www.zillow.com/blog/doubling-up-161820/ [https://perma.cc/UG4R-3U4K].
8. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (creating the apparent authority third partyconsent exception).
9. 745 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
10. See id. at 553–54 (noting that Hicks’s statement made it unreasonable for the police to believe
that Hicks shared use of the closed shoebox).
11. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the obviousness
approach); United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
12. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136 (“No officer ever saw Snype carrying the knapsack or red plastic
bag. No marks on the bags linked them to him.”); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (“there were no
exterior markings on the purse that should have alerted them to the fact that it belonged to another
person.”).
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The ambiguity approach articulated by the D.C. Circuit is the only
approach currently used in the circuit courts that complies with Supreme
Court precedent and widely shared social expectations. However, the
case-by-case analysis is both administratively cumbersome and difficult
to predict.13 This Comment advocates a new approach that goes further
in protecting individual privacy.
To properly safeguard individuals’ constitutional right to privacy in
their home, law enforcement officers should have an affirmative duty to
clarify the scope of the consenting party’s authority by asking if they
have actual authority over each container in a common area.14 Under this
approach, if police receive consent to search a living room and then find
a backpack, they would have an affirmative duty to ask the consenting
party, “Does this backpack belong to you?”15 Anything short of this
bright-line clarification would render the search unreasonable and
outside the protection of the apparent authority doctrine.
This Comment presents this argument in five main parts. Part I of this
Comment examines the history of the third party consent doctrine
through an analysis of landmark Supreme Court cases. Part II explores
the Supreme Court’s tradition of protecting individuals’ privacy rights in
their homes and examines modern trends in cohabitation. Part III
considers the conflicting circuit court decisions that arose in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Matlock16 and its
progeny. Part IV demonstrates that the two approaches currently used by
circuit courts fail to adequately protect individuals’ privacy expectations
in the home. Part V argues that the Supreme Court should abandon the
standard-based approach and adopt a bright-line rule for third party
consent searches of closed containers.
I.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT PERMITS SEARCHES
BASED ON THIRD PARTY CONSENT

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
citizens from “unreasonable searches” and provides that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”17 “An essential purpose of a
warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (involving similar facts, albeit with a shoebox instead of a
backpack).
16. 415 U.S. 164, 169–72 (1974).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or
arbitrary acts of government agents.”18 However, the warrant
requirement is not an absolute prerequisite to reasonableness in
conducting a search.19 The warrant requirement is subject to several
judicially created exceptions.20
Perhaps the most frequently used exception to the warrant
requirement is voluntary consent.21 A consent search takes place after an
individual voluntarily agrees to let the government conduct a search.
These searches are a critical tool used by police when investigating
criminal activity.22 A specific sub-set of this exception, third party
consent, has continued to evolve over the last four decades.23 The term
“third party consent” refers to situations where one person consents to
the search of an area over which he or she shares common authority with
another tenant.24 The Supreme Court has evaluated the issue in a variety
of ways in an attempt to create a uniform constitutional standard
balancing the needs of law enforcement with the individual privacy
rights.25 Four prominent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Matlock,

18. Skinner v. Ry Labor Execs, 489 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1989); see also United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits both unreasonable searches and
unreasonable seizures, and its protection extends to both ‘houses’ and ‘effects.’”).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions”).
20. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (noting that “The Fourth Amendment
demonstrates a ‘strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant’”) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (“The
exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant have been jealously and
carefully drawn . . . .”).
21. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (noting that it is “well settled that one
of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent”).
22. See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 (2001–
02) (noting that “[a]lthough precise figures detailing the number of searches conducted pursuant to
consent are not—and probably can never be—available, there is no dispute that these type of
searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year.”).
23. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(d) (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.3(a)-(e) (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
24. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–72 (1974) (recognizing the common
authority doctrine).
25. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (creating the third party consent exception
to the apparent authority doctrine); Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169–72 (recognizing the common authority
doctrine); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (applying the assumption-of-risk test in cases
of shared personal property).
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Illinois v. Rodriguez,26 Georgia v. Randolph,27 and Fernandez v.
California,28 demonstrate the nuances of the judicially created apparent
authority doctrine. Matlock and Rodriguez establish the basic rule of the
third party consent doctrine, while Randolph and Fernandez address
fact-specific exceptions to the basic rule.29
A.

The Supreme Court Adopted the Apparent Authority Doctrine to
Resolve Cases Involving Third Party Consent

In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court ruled that someone
with common authority over an area may consent to a government
search of that area.30 The defendant’s living situation in Matlock is
illustrative of the complexities of modern living arrangements.31 The
defendant, William Earl Matlock, leased a home and shared the premises
with one of the owners and several of the owner’s children, including
her daughter, Gayle Graff.32 The police suspected Matlock of robbing a
federally insured bank.33 After taking the defendant into custody on his
front lawn, the officers detained him in a police car waiting on a nearby
street.34 Although the officers were aware at the time of the arrest that
the defendant lived in the home, they made no attempt to procure his
consent to a search.35 The arresting officers chose to remove the
defendant from the area and request consent to search the home from
Graff, who was watching from the front door.36 Graff agreed to a search
of the house, and officers discovered incriminating evidence in a
common area.37
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the search.38 The
Court clarified that to justify a warrantless search on the basis of
voluntary consent, the state is not required to demonstrate that consent
26. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
27. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
28. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
29. Id. at 1134–36; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115–20; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; Matlock, 415 U.S.
at 169–72.
30. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169–72.
31. Id. at 166–68.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 177.
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was given specifically by the defendant, only that permission to search
has been obtained from a third party who possessed common authority
over the premises—like Graff.39 Additionally, the Court determined that
under living arrangements in which two or more individuals share a
home, it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-tenants have the
right to consent to a search and that the other co-tenants have “assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched.”40 Therefore, by sharing a home with Graff, Matlock had
assumed the risk that Graff might exercise her right to allow the police
to search the premises.41
Sixteen years later, the Court substantially expanded third party
consent power to include the consent of any third party who officers
reasonably believe possesses common authority over the premises.42 In
Illinois v. Rodriguez, a woman claiming to be the victim of an assault at
the hands of her ex-boyfriend contacted police to report the
incident.43 The woman, Fischer, told the police that the defendant,
Rodriguez, was asleep inside the apartment where she and Rodriguez
lived together, and that she would be willing to let them inside to arrest
Rodriguez.44 In reality, Fischer no longer lived in the apartment—a fact
not known to the officers.45 Upon arrival, Fischer granted the officers
entrance to the apartment where they discovered Rodriguez sleeping, as
well as evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia.46 In examining the
effect of Fischer’s apparent authority to give consent, the Court reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement
conducting a search under an exception to the warrant requirement to
always be correct in their assessment of the situation, but only to act
reasonably given the circumstances.47 The Court remanded the case to
the appellate court to determine whether law enforcement reasonably
believed that Fischer possessed the necessary authority to grant the
search.48

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 169–72.
Id.
Id.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
Id. at 179–80.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 189.
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The Supreme Court Addressed Fact-Specific Exceptions in the
Years Following Rodriguez

In 2006, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph crafted a new,
fact-specific exception to its landmark holding in United States v.
Matlock.49 The Court held that a present co-tenant’s objection to a search
of his home is controlling, even if the other co-tenant is present and
consents to the search.50 In other words, Matlock established that a
present roommate can consent to a search of a house, but Randolph says
that same consent can be blocked by different co-tenants if they are
present and assert their Fourth Amendment rights.51
Eight years after Randolph, the Supreme Court decided Fernandez v.
California, reaffirming its decision in Rodriguez that absent residents
cannot object to a search—even if the absence is caused by law
enforcement removal.52 In Fernandez, officers knocked on the door of a
residence from which they heard screams.53 A woman opened the door
and told the officers that she was alone with her son and that no one else
was present.54 When the officers asked her if she would step outside so
that they could conduct a protective sweep of the apartment, Fernandez
appeared in the doorway and objected to the sweep.55 The officers
suspected domestic violence and immediately removed Fernandez from
the residence and placed him under arrest.56
One hour after the initial arrest, officers returned to the apartment,
informed the woman that they had arrested Fernandez, and again asked
for permission to search the premises.57 The woman consented to the
search.58 In the apartment, police found gang paraphernalia, weapons,
and ammunition.59 The Supreme Court held that the search was lawful
because Fernandez was removed from the premises for lawful
purposes.60
49. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Fernandez v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–36 (2014).
53. Id. at 1130–31.
54. Id.
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1130–31; People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),
aff’d, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
60. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
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Matlock and its progeny provide the legal rules governing third party
consent cases. The government may rebut the presumption that a
warrantless search is unreasonable by showing that someone with
authority permitted the law enforcement officers to conduct the
search.61 Such consent need not come from the target of the search; it
may come from “a third party who possesse[s] common authority
over . . . the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”62 “Common
authority” does not refer to some kind of “technical property
interest.”63 It arises simply from
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit
the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area
to be searched.64
Even people who do not actually use the property can authorize a
search if it is reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe they
have authority over the property.65 Such “apparent authority” is
sufficient to sustain a search because the Fourth Amendment requires
“not that [officers’ factual determinations] always be correct, but that
they always be reasonable.”66 To object to a search, a person must be
physically present—this objection will overcome the consent of any
other resident.67 Law enforcement officers may remove the objecting
party if they have a lawful reason to do so, and his objection will no
longer be effective.68
The Supreme Court precedent discussed above informs the discussion
of co-tenant consent searches. However, the precedent does not directly
address the present issue of whether one housemate may consent to a
search of all containers in a common area. The answer to that question
requires courts to decide whether an officer can sustain a reasonable

61. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
62. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
63. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006).
64. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
65. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186.
66. Id. at 185; see also id. at 186 (“Whether the basis for such authority exists is the sort of
recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their
judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.”).
67. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115–20.
68. Fernandez v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–36 (2014).
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belief that the consenting party has authority over an item in light of
facts that make ownership of the item ambiguous.69
II.

WHEN DECIDING FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES, THE
SUPREME COURT PLACES A HIGH VALUE ON PRIVACY
IN THE HOME AND OFTEN CONSIDERS SOCIAL
EXPECTATIONS IN ITS ANALYSIS

“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.”70 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
individuals are given the most protection from government intrusion
when they are in their homes.71 The Court often supports its reasoning
by reference to historical customs and widely shared social
expectations.72 The number of people in the United States living with
roommates has risen dramatically over the last forty years, and the social
expectations surrounding roommate relationships have changed with it.73
Thus, the Supreme Court would be warranted in revisiting precedent and
adopting a new rule to govern third party consent cases over closed
containers.

69. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
70. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
71. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296–97 (1984) (“We frequently have noted
that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585–86 (1980) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972))).
72. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–18 (2013) (“[T]he
background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a
search . . . .”); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114 (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting
co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to
reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”)
(emphasis added); id. at 120 (“But nothing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for
placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed
consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters
over a resident’s objection.”).
73. See infra section II.C.
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The Supreme Court Has Traditionally Maximized Personal Privacy
by Providing Individuals the Highest Possible Levels of Protection
in their Homes

In the common law tradition, a man’s home is his castle.74 The castle
metaphor refers to the home as the “exemplary site of personal liberty
from state intrusion and control. The state’s authority stops at the
threshold.”75 This principle is essential to third party consent searches
because it suggests that the Court is reluctant to allow third parties to
erode individuals’ right to privacy in their homes. The Supreme Court
has followed the common law tradition by extending heightened
protections to the home under the Fourth Amendment76: “when it comes
to the [F]ourth [A]mendment, the home is first among equals.”77
Given the Court’s home privacy concerns, it has carved out special
rules that apply in the context of home searches by law enforcement
officers.78 For example, the police cannot take a drug-sniffing dog onto
the porch of an individual’s home, even though pedestrians are
traditionally allowed to walk up to someone’s door and knock.79 In
Florida v. Jardines,80 the police suspected that Jardines was growing
marijuana inside his home.81 An officer and a drug-sniffing dog
approached Jardines’s front door with the intent to discover evidence
that could support a finding of probable cause for a warrant.82 The dog
sniffed around the door and signaled to the officer that narcotics were
present inside the home.83 The Court held that this constituted an illegal
74. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
CHANGING PRIVACY 2–5 (2009); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 (“We have, after all, lived our
whole national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient adage that a man’s home is his
castle.’”) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
75. SUK, supra note 74, at 5.
76. Baith, 598 A.2d at 764; see also Clifford, 464 U.S. at 296–97 (“We frequently have noted that
privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–
86 (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
77. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
78. See id. at 1415–18 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–40 (2001); Clifford, 464
U.S. at 296–97 (“We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private
residence.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–86 (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 313));
Baith, 598 A.2d at 764.
79. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1413.
82. See id.
83. Id.
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search because the officer was trespassing on Jardines’s property when
the search took place.84 The Court recognized that some visitors, like
Girl Scouts, have an implied license to approach the front door to knock
but held that an officer with a drug-sniffing dog does not have such a
license, and therefore trespasses if he approaches one’s door with a drug
dog.85 It grounded this conclusion in social custom, saying that “the
background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not
invite him there to conduct a search.”86
Similarly, the Court has held that using sense-enhancing technology
to observe the inside of a home is unlawful, even if law enforcement
officers are using this technology from a lawful vantage point.87 In Kyllo
v. United States,88 the Court considered the propriety of police use of
thermal-imaging technology to detect a marijuana grow operation.
Officers suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana inside his home and used
a thermal-imaging device—not available to the public—to determine
whether Kyllo was using high-powered indoor lights to simulate
artificial sunlight.89 Using this device, they discovered an unusual
amount of heat emanating from the garage. 90 The police used this
evidence to obtain a search warrant which led to the discovery of 100
marijuana plants inside the home.91 The Supreme Court ruled that even
the thermal imaging of Kyllo’s home from a lawful vantage point
constituted a warrantless search, holding that a person has a heightened
expectation of privacy within his home.92
As Jardines and Kyllo illustrate, the Supreme Court has voiced strong
concerns over warrantless government searches that occur inside or even
near the home.93 In the context of third party consent searches, the
government typically conducts a warrantless search within the home.94 It
follows that the Supreme Court would be highly skeptical of any third
party consent searches by the government that do not strictly adhere to

84. Id. at 1415–18.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 29–31.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 40.
93. Id.; Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–18 (2013).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v.
Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the rule it advanced in Rodriguez—that officers can rely on third party
consent only when they reasonably believe that the consenting party has
authority over the premises.95 This reasonableness inquiry should be
informed by Supreme Court precedent establishing that the Fourth
Amendment applies most strictly in the home.96 Thus, when officers face
ambiguity, the third party consent analysis should be weighted in favor
of protecting individual rights.97
B.

The Supreme Court Has Traditionally Considered Social Customs
and Expectations in its Analysis of Fourth Amendment Cases

In seminal Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has placed a
high value on social customs.98 For example, in Georgia v. Randolph,
the Supreme Court based the primary legal rationale for its decision on a
concept it referred to as “widely shared social expectations.”99 The Court
reasoned that law enforcement cannot enter a residence if a present cotenant objects to a search because no “social practice” supports allowing
one co-tenant to get her way over another objecting cotenant.100 Applying this restrictive standard, the Court invalidated the
search of the Randolph home and carved a limited exception to the
common authority rule that it deemed more aligned with the
particularities of social norms.101
The origin of the social expectations concept within Fourth
Amendment law traces back to Katz v. United States.102 Under the Katz
95. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
96. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“[W]hen it comes to the [F]ourth [A]mendment, the home is
first among equals.”).
97. See Michael C. Weiber, Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an Officer’s
Reasonable Belief About a Third Party’s Authority to Consent Does Not Protect a Criminal
Suspect’s Rights, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 634 (1993) (“Thus, in balancing the interests
of the government and the individual, [Justice Marshall] concluded that the weight clearly falls on
the side of protecting defendant’s rights.”).
98. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–20
(2006).
99. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.
100. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114.
101. Id. at 115–20.
102. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court held that the government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording defendant’s words spoken into telephone receiver in public
telephone booth violated the defendant’s privacy and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within
the Fourth Amendment. Id. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion set forth a twofold test for
determining whether an expectation of privacy exists: first, a person must have a subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as “reasonable.” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ruling, to make a valid claim of protection under the Fourth Amendment,
a criminal defendant must demonstrate that he or she had a personal
expectation of privacy in the place where the search occurred, and that
this expectation is “one society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”103 The Court in Rakas v. Illinois104 explained that in order
to legitimize an expectation of privacy under Katz, it must refer to a
“source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”105 In Rakas, the Court used social
custom to analyze the rights of the occupants of a motor vehicle, none of
whom possessed any property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the
evidence seized within.106 The Court held that because the defendants
failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched
automobile, they therefore lacked a capacity to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment.107
The next notable application of the social expectations analysis arose
in the context of standing in Minnesota v. Olsen.108 In Olsen, the Court
explicitly held that an overnight guest in a friend’s home had a
legitimate expectation of privacy there, and thus possessed the requisite
legal standing to assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment
protections.109 By simply recognizing the “everyday expectations of
privacy that we all share” the Court firmly established that an overnight
houseguest shares not only in his host’s home, but also in his expectation
103. Id.
104. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
105. Id. at 144 n.12.
106. Id. at 129–50.
107. Id. at 148. In describing the defendant’s constitutional standing, the Court stated that:
They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in
the property seized. And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were “legitimately
on [the] premises” in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not
determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of
the automobile searched.
Id.
108. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
109. Id. at 99 (“From the overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s home
precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be
disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable
when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It
is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our
own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room or the home of a
friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth, ‘a
temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable.’”).
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of privacy therein.110 These cases illustrate that in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court will look to social expectations to inform
its analysis. In resolving the circuit split on third party consent, the Court
should once again look to social expectations, recognizing that
roommate relationships, and the social expectations that surround these
relationships, have changed over the last several decades.111
C.

Since the Supreme Court’s Decision in Matlock, the Number of
Americans Living with Roommates Has Risen Sharply

The number of young adults living with a roommate has increased
while married household arrangements wane.112 The share of young
adults living with a roommate rose from 6% in 1968 to 27% in 2012.113
Meanwhile, the share of young adults who are married and living in their
own homes plummeted from 56% in 1968 to 23% in 2012.114
This dramatic rise in the share of adults living with roommates may
be related to a variety of factors.115 For example, the number of adults
cohabiting outside of marriage has increased significantly.116 A study
conducted by the University of Minnesota suggests that from the year
110. Id. at 98–99 (“That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not
inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with
the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest.”).
111. See infra section II.C.
112. See Richard Fry, For the First Time in Modern Era, Living With Parents Edges Out Other
Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds, PEW RES. CTR. (May 24, 2016),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/05/24/for-first-time-in-modern-era-living-with-parents-edgesout-other-living-arrangements-for-18-to-34-year-olds/ [https://perma.cc/Q7CF-8M7B] [hereinafter
Fry, Living With Parents]. Those trends correlate with an increase in rent prices: today, Americans
making the median national income should expect to pay almost a third of their income on rent,
marking an all-time high. Salama, supra note 7. Many states follow the rule that all assets acquired
during marriage are considered “community property.” U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Basic
Principles of Community Property Law, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-018001.html [https://perma.cc/Z5E3-NP5K]. As a result, this Comment, and the studies cited within,
treat married spouses different than roommates. Furthermore, the concerns surrounding privacy
rights being inadvertently eroded by a third party are generally less prevalent when the two people
in question are involved in an intimate personal relationship such as a marriage. See United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166–67 (1974) (finding that the consenting party had no actual authority and
tried to have the actual resident arrested).
113. See Fry, Living with Parents, supra note 112.
114. See id. Note that the Pew Research Center tabulations do not consider married couples to be
roommates for the purposes of this study. See id. fig.3. Thus, any reference to roommates in this
Comment refers to unmarried, cohabiting adults.
115. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-havenever-married/[https://perma.cc/44EL-NRME].
116. Id.
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1960 to 2000, the percentage of unmarried couples living together has
increased by more than tenfold.117 Another factor contributing to the
overall rise in cohabitation is the trend of adults living with parents.118 In
2014, for the first time in more than 130 years, adults ages eighteen to
thirty-four were slightly more likely to be living in their parents’ homes
than they were to be living with a spouse or partner in their own
household.119
A 2005 study of adult living arrangements found that Black and
Hispanic persons are the most likely to live at home with parents.120
Record-high shares of young Black and Hispanic adults lived in the
home of a parent in 2014: 36% for each group.121 For young Black
adults, living with a parent is now the most common arrangement, as
only 17% were living with a spouse or romantic partner in 2014.122 For
young Hispanic adults, living with a parent is also the dominant
arrangement, as 30% were living with a spouse or significant other in
2014.123 By comparison, 30% of young white adults lived at home with a
parent. The high rate of cohabitation in the Black and Hispanic
communities suggests that third party consent cases will affect
individuals from these communities at a disproportionately higher rate.
Thus, the problems with the third party consent law addressed later in
this Comment may affect minority populations more than white
populations.
The growth of public housing in the late twentieth century has also
contributed to the prevalence of shared living arrangements. There are
approximately 1.2 million households living in public housing units in
America, managed by some 3300 housing agencies.124 Experts speculate
that there is a large population of people living in public housing units
that go unreported.125 These so-called “ghost tenants” are tenants who
117. Catherine Fitch et al., The Rise of Cohabitation in the United States: New Historical
Estimates, MINN. POPULATION CTR. U. OF MINN. (March 2005), http://users.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/
cohab-revised2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE62-Y7FJ] (figs.1 & 2).
118. Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD’s Public Housing Program, HUD.GOV,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/G6E7WLBZ].
125. Joe Anuta, How Many People Live in the City's Public Housing? The Answer Is in the
Trash, CRAIN’S (October 29, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20151029/REAL_
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are off the records, sometimes sleeping in living rooms or other cramped
spaces with other tenants.126 In New York City, which is home to the
largest public housing authority in North America,127 “ghost tenancy” is
especially problematic. 400,000 people officially live in New York
City’s traditional public housing units, but the New York City Housing
Authority estimates that an additional 100,000 or more reside there
secretly.128 Thus, the population living in New York City’s publicly
owned housing could be twenty-five percent higher than the official
count provides.129
The rising ghost tenant problem, and the greater cohabitation
phenomenon it illustrates, complicates application of the third party
consent doctrine and raises significant questions about whether courts
should rely on third party consent without requiring police to inquire
further. Given the ghost tenant problem, courts should consider whether
it is reasonable for law enforcement to assume that individuals
answering the door have authority to consent to searches. Courts should
also consider whether the analysis changes if a legal tenant answers the
door and law enforcement officials seek to search space that is obviously
inhabited by someone other than the consenting party.
Given the rise in shared living spaces and ghost tenants, it is critically
important that United States residents have clear rules governing third
party consent to searches of shared living spaces.130 The current legal
framework, particularly in the Second and Seventh Circuits, requires law
enforcement to inquire about the scope of the consenting party’s
authority only in special situations.131 This means that law enforcement
officers sometimes do not know if the items they searched actually

ESTATE/151029852/how-many-people-live-in-the-citys-public-housing-the-answer-is-in-the-trash
[https://perma.cc/BLW8-2LWF] (“The waste-collection data suggest the Housing Authority's actual
ranks are at least 100,000 larger than the official number.”).
126. Jake Blumgart, The Ghost Tenants of New York City, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/03/new_york_city_public_housing_could_h
ave_more_than_100_000_ghost_tenants.html [https://perma.cc/KZZ2-FXQT]. Given the confined
scope of this Comment, it does not attempt to resolve the “Ghost Tenant” issue. Rather, the issue is
raised here to show the complexity of the third party consent issue given modern living
arrangements.
127. Facts About NYCHA, N.Y. CITY HOUS. AUTH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK56-J9LX].
128. Blumgart, supra note 126.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar,
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
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belong to the consenting party or an absent roommate.132 Thus,
individuals who live with roommates are at a greater risk of having their
belongings searched by police without their consent.
III. CIRCUIT COURTS ARE SPLIT REGARDING THE DUTY OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT TO CLARIFY AUTHORITY OVER
CONTAINERS IN A SHARED SPACE
The apparent authority doctrine permits searches based on third party
consent where the officers conducting the search “reasonably believe”
that the person who has consented to the search has authority over the
premises.133 But when police encounter closed containers in a common
area, the apparent authority doctrine becomes difficult to apply.134
Because millions of Americans live with roommates, and therefore share
authority over common areas, it is essential that Americans have clear
rules governing consent searches of closed containers in those areas.135
Circuit courts disagree as to whether law enforcement has an
affirmative duty to ask the consenting party if he or she has actual
authority over an ambiguous item in a common area.136 The Second and
Seventh Circuits require law enforcement to ask about ownership of a
container in a common area only if the container obviously does not
belong to the consenting party.137 The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
require law enforcement to ask about ownership of a container if
ownership is at least ambiguous.138 This Comment seeks to resolve the
legal conflict by requiring law enforcement to ask before searching any
container in a common area. Such an approach places the informational
burden on the party best situated to bear it—the government.139

132. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
133. Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990).
134. Compare Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54, and United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82
(6th Cir. 2010), with Snype, 441 F.3d at 119, and Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
135. Salama, supra note 7.
136. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
137. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (holding that obvious ownership is indicated by exterior
markings that should alert officers that it is owned by another person); Snype, 441 F.3d 119 (same).
138. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82.
139. See infra Part IV. The police are best situated to bear the burden of asking clarifying
questions because they have a responsibility to protect citizens, a responsibility that should include
protecting citizens from having their privacy rights eroded by others. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN
POLICE AND CITIZENS (2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicing
final092003.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4F-8T6N] [hereinafter DOJ PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING]
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The Second and Seventh Circuits Have Adopted the Obviousness
Approach, Which Allows Officers to Rely on Third Party Consent
Even When Ownership of the Item Is Ambiguous and Uncertain

The cases discussed in this section demonstrate the obviousness
approach: law enforcement officers have an affirmative duty to clarify
ownership of a container only if the container obviously belongs to
someone other than the consenting party.140 The Second and Seventh
Circuits have adopted the obviousness standard, meaning officers do not
need to clarify ownership of ambiguous items in a common area.141
According to the Second Circuit, a female resident’s open-ended
consent can extend to her male overnight guest’s room and
belongings.142 In United States v. Snype,143 FBI officers obtained an
arrest warrant for Vernon Snype144 and forcibly entered Jennifer Bean’s
apartment to arrest him.145 On the floor of the bedroom where Snype was
arrested, officers found a knapsack that contained evidence linking him
to a robbery.146 After removing Snype from the apartment, officers
sought Bean’s consent to search her residence, which she voluntarily
gave.147 At a suppression hearing, she explained that she had never met
Snype before her boyfriend asked if he could spend the night at her
apartment.148
Despite the fact that Snype was an overnight guest, his motion to
suppress was denied.149 On appeal, the Second Circuit considered
whether Bean’s consent was sufficient for police to search the containers
in the residence.150 The court first noted that “her open-ended consent
would permit the search and seizure of any items found in the apartment
with the exception of those ‘obviously’ belonging to another person.”151
Thus, Snype could not merely assert that there was no reasonable basis
(“[T]he police, by virtue of the authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility
for the outcome of encounters with citizens.”).
140. Snype, 441 F.3d at 126–27.
141. See id. at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
142. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 136.
150. Id. at 136–37.
151. Id. at 136.
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for searching the containers; he bore the burden of presenting evidence
that established the containers “were obviously and exclusively his.”152
Because the containers were not marked and the room in which they
were found housed objects “ranging from children’s toys to a laptop
computer found inside a carrying case,” the court concluded that the
defendant failed to demonstrate that he obviously and exclusively owned
the containers.153
According to the Seventh Circuit, a person’s open-ended consent can
extend to all closed containers in a room, even those hidden underneath
a mattress.154 In United States v. Melgar,155 the police arrived at a hotel
room looking for counterfeit checks and asked several women in the
room for permission to search their purses.156 An officer then asked the
woman renting the room for her consent to search the room, which she
voluntarily gave.157 The police looked under a mattress and discovered
an unmarked floral purse that contained a counterfeit check and an
identification form indicating the defendant—not the consenting
woman—was the purse’s owner.158
The Seventh Circuit heard the appeal from the District Court, which
denied Melgar’s motion to suppress.159 After determining that the
consenting woman had the apparent authority to consent to the search of
the hotel room, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to the question of
whether she had apparent authority over the purse:
In a sense, the real question for closed container searches is
which way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such a search
permissible only if the police have positive knowledge that the
closed container is also under the authority of the person who
originally consented to the search . . . or is it permissible if the
police do not have reliable information that the container is not
under the authorizer’s control.160

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 136–37.
United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1039–40.
Id.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1041.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Ultimately, the court found that “the police had no reason to know
that the floral purse they found under the mattress did not belong to [the
consenting party].”161
In sum, the Second and Seventh Circuits have extended a co-tenant’s
open-ended consent to closed containers in a common area, except those
that obviously do not belong to that co-tenant.162 In the absence of an
officer’s positive knowledge that a container belongs to another, or some
other clear manifestation of privacy, officers can rely on someone’s
open-ended consent to search any container in a common area.163
B.

The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Have Adopted the Ambiguity
Approach, Which Requires Officers to Inquire About Actual
Authority When Ownership of an Item Is Ambiguous

Two circuit courts have adopted the ambiguity approach, holding that
law enforcement officers are required to clarify ownership of ambiguous
items in a common area.164 By adopting this ambiguity standard, the
Sixth and the D.C. Circuits have narrowed the scope of a resident’s
open-ended consent to include only those items and areas that do not
raise any questions of ownership in the minds of a reasonable officer.165
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he government cannot establish that
its agents reasonably relied upon a third party’s apparent authority if
agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without
making further inquiry.”166
The Sixth Circuit held that prior false assertions of authority
generated sufficient ambiguity to trigger the officer’s duty to inquire.167
In United States v. Purcell,168 after the police arrested Frederick Purcell,
his girlfriend, Yolande Crist, consented to a search of their hotel
room.169 The police observed two duffel bags and a backpack in the
room, and Crist stated that one contained a firearm.170 She also indicated
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1041–42; United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006).
163. See Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42; Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37.
164. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Taylor,
600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963–64 (6th Cir.
2008).
165. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82.
166. Purcell, 526 F.3d at 963.
167. Id. at 964–65.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 956–58.
170. Id. at 957–58.
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that one of the duffel bags was hers, and upon searching it, an officer
found marijuana and men’s clothing.171 During his search, the officer
“realized that Crist had misstated her ownership of the bag, [but] he did
not ask her to verify whether she owned any of the other bags in the
room” before continuing to search them.172
The court acknowledged that Crist had the apparent authority to
consent to a search of the room, but noted that “apparent authority
cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the
searching officers do not take steps to resolve the ambiguity.” 173 Once
the officer discovered men’s clothing in the bag claimed by Crist,
“ambiguity clouded [her] authority to consent to the search of the
backpack.”174 As such, the police were obligated to obtain additional
consent to search the other items in the room.175
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in a different case, holding
that a woman’s open-ended consent did not extend to a spare bedroom
filled with men’s clothes.176 In United States v. Taylor,177 police had an
outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant, Mark Taylor, but did not
have a search warrant for the apartment where they believed he was
staying as a guest.178 Officers arrived at the apartment and were met by
Sabrina Arnett, the tenant, who allowed police to search the apartment
for Taylor.179 After arresting Taylor upstairs, and removing him from the
premises, officers returned to the second floor, where they had
previously noticed a spare bedroom with “men’s clothes lying about.”180
They entered the spare bedroom, searched the closet, and found a men’s
shoebox containing a handgun and ammunition.181
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first noted the circumstantial ambiguity:
the closet contained a mix of men’s and children’s clothing, and
“nothing in the closet indicated that the items within it belonged to
Arnett or were regularly used by her.”182 The court determined that a
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 965.
United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 679–80.
Id. at 681–82.
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reasonable person would have doubts about the ownership of the
shoebox and added that the district court had found that “the police
would likely not have opened the closed shoebox if they believed it
belonged to Arnett. Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely because
they believed it likely belonged to Taylor.”183 The court found the police
officer’s failure to cure the factual ambiguity was fatal to Arnett’s
apparent authority to consent.184
Similarly, in United States v. Peyton,185 the D.C. Circuit held that a
grandmother’s open-ended consent did not extend to her grandson’s
personal space.186 Peyton and his eighty-five-year-old grandmother,
Martha Hicks, were residents of a one-bedroom apartment in
Washington, D.C.187 Peyton’s bed and personal property were in the
living room, and Hicks used the bedroom.188 Four officers went to the
apartment when they knew that Peyton would be gone and asked Hicks
to consent to a search of the apartment.189 As one of the officers
approached Peyton’s bed, Hicks “told them that that part of the living
room was ‘the area where [Peyton] keeps his personal property.’”190 One
of the officers then picked up a shoebox next to Peyton’s bed, opened it,
and found drugs and other incriminating evidence.191
The D.C. Circuit held the search was unlawful because Hicks did not
have actual or apparent authority over Peyton’s shoebox.192 According to
the court, Hicks’s statement about Peyton’s “personal property” should
have alerted the police that it was unreasonable to believe she had
authority over Peyton’s belongings.193 Hicks’s statements created
ambiguity as to the ownership of the shoebox, triggering the officer’s
duty to inquire.194
In summary, the circuit courts have developed two standards to
examine officers’ conduct when they encounter ambiguous containers
during a search based on third party consent. These standards attempt to
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 682.
Id. at 679, 685.
745 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 549, 553–54.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 549–50.
Id. at 554–55.
Id.
Id.
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reconcile the heightened expectations of privacy afforded to closed
containers with law enforcement’s need to conduct an efficient, thorough
search of the premises.195 On the one hand, courts employing the
obviousness standard permit a closed-container search when an officer
lacks positive knowledge that a container does not belong to the
consenting party.196 On the other hand, courts employing the ambiguity
standard use positive knowledge in another way—when the
circumstances present any degree of uncertainty or ambiguity, law
enforcement must obtain positive knowledge that the container in
question belongs to the consenting party.197
IV. THE AMBIGUITY APPROACH IS SUPERIOR TO THE
OBVIOUSNESS APPROACH, BUT BOTH APPROACHES
FAIL TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT INDIVIDUALS’
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN THE HOME
The ambiguity approach provides greater privacy protections than the
obviousness approach,198 but neither approach adequately protects
individuals from unreasonable government searches of containers in
their home. The obviousness approach is not consistent with the
apparent authority doctrine because it does not use the concept of
reasonableness to constrain the scope of police searches.199 The
ambiguity approach uses reasonableness to constrain the scope of police
searches, but still leaves open the potential for police to search a
container that does not actually belong to the consenting tenant.200 Thus,
the ambiguity approach is more consistent with Rodriguez—but neither
standard adequately protects the rights of individuals to be free from
unreasonable searches in their home.

195. See id. at 552–54.
196. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar,
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
197. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963–64 (6th Cir. 2008).
198. Compare Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (protecting an absent tenant’s privacy in his container)
with Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (allowing the police to search an overnight guest’s containers
without his consent).
199. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the police can search any containers that do not
obviously belong to someone other than the consenting party).
200. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (holding that the police can search any container when
ownership of the container is not ambiguous).
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The Obviousness Approach Is Not Consistent with the Apparent
Authority Doctrine

The obviousness approach is not consistent with the apparent
authority doctrine because it allows law enforcement to search an
unmarked container even if it is unreasonable for officers to believe the
consenting party has authority over the container.201 For example,
imagine that the police knock on the door of a two-bedroom apartment
because they suspect that someone in the apartment is selling drugs. A
man with a long beard wearing a Donald Trump campaign shirt opens
the door. The police ask for permission to search the apartment, and the
man responds, “Go ahead and search the place, my roommate, Anna, is
at a Women’s Rights march—she left all her stuff here and won’t be
home for hours.” On a couch in the living room, officers find a pink
purse on top of a rainbow-colored blanket.
In light of the man’s statement about his female roommate leaving her
belongings in the apartment, it seems like a reasonable officer would
have doubts about whether the bearded man wearing the Trump shirt has
authority over the pink purse in the living room. 202 Thus, under the
apparent authority doctrine—which is grounded in an officer’s
reasonable belief that the person has authority to consent—the officers
should be prohibited from searching the purse.203 Yet, the fact that it is
unreasonable does not prevent police from searching the purse if the
jurisdiction has adopted the obviousness standard.204 Under the
obviousness approach, when given open-ended consent to search a
common area, law enforcement officers can search anything that does
not have clear exterior markings indicating obvious and exclusive

201. But cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the open-ended consent of a female resident
extends to the search of a knapsack and red plastic bag found in the spare bedroom where a male
house guest was arrested); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (holding that the open-ended consent of a
female occupant extends to a purse found under a mattress in a hotel room used by multiple women,
one of whom had two purses).
202. The Washington Law Review and the author of this Comment do not support making broad
generalizations about groups of people based on their appearance or political beliefs. This
hypothetical references political and gender-based stereotypes to illustrate a very delicate point
about ambiguity and uncertainty in the mind of a reasonable officer during a search.
203. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (establishing the apparent authority
doctrine and suggesting that “[e]ven when [an] invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion
that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a
reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry”).
204. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
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ownership by another party.205 Because the purse here does not have
exterior markings linking it to another person, law enforcement officers
in obviousness jurisdictions can search the purse without asking
clarifying questions.206
The obviousness approach, by allowing officers to search a container
even when a reasonable officer would not believe that the consenting
party has authority over the container, stretches the apparent authority
doctrine beyond its constitutional limits.207
1.

Case Law Demonstrates that the Obviousness Approach Is
Inconsistent with the Apparent Authority Doctrine

The Supreme Court has urged officers to be skeptical when relying on
third party consent.208 As the Rodriguez Court put it:
Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion
that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could
conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its
truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with other
factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’”
that the consenting party had authority over the premises?209
The Second and Seventh Circuits may claim to be applying the
apparent authority doctrine, but the obviousness standard appears to give
law enforcement more power than what the Supreme Court’s apparent
authority doctrine intends: the obviousness standard allows the police to
ignore ambiguity that would defeat an officer’s reasonable belief.
The application of the obviousness approach in Snype and Melgar
illustrates the consequences of the broad obviousness approach. The
Second Circuit in Snype authorized a search under circumstances that

205. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the bag did not obviously belong to Snype
because “[n]o marks on the bags linked them to him” and he failed to produce evidence
“demonstrating that these items were obviously and exclusively his.”); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42
(holding that the purse did not obviously belong to another woman because there were “no exterior
markings on the purse that should have alerted them to the fact that it belonged to another person”).
206. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (allowing the police to search containers that lack exterior
markings indicating obvious ownership by another person); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (same).
207. But see Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (endorsing the obviousness approach); Melgar, 227 F.3d
at 1041–42 (same).
208. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
209. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (alteration in original).
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raised serious doubts about the ownership of the items seized.210 Upon
realizing Snype stayed in the spare bedroom, a reasonable officer should
have substantial doubts as to whether all of the items in the room
belonged to Bean.211 Here, it seems likely that the police searched the
knapsack and other items precisely because they thought those items
belonged to Snype—not because officers believed the items belonged to
Bean.212 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Melgar authorized the search
of a purse found in a room used by multiple women, when only one
woman consented to a search.213 To constitutionally search the purse
under the mattress, the police must have reasonably believed it belonged
to the consenting party.214
In Snype and Melgar, ownership of the items searched was at least
ambiguous. A cautious application of the apparent authority doctrine
would council further inquiry into the consenting party’s authority
before proceeding with the search.215 In both cases, the police should
have been aware that the consenting party might not have actual
authority over the items searched, but continued their searches because
the ambiguity did not rise to the level of obvious ownership by another
party.216 The obviousness approach ignores the constraints placed on
police by the apparent authority doctrine and threatens to undermine the
Court’s protection of individuals’ privacy in their home.

210. See id.
211. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2014). (“The police] knew that
Hicks and Peyton both lived in the small apartment, and they were thus on notice that some spaces
in the apartment might be used exclusively by Peyton.”).
212. See United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[N]othing in the closet
indicated that the items within it belonged to [the defendant’s girlfriend] or were regularly used by
her . . . .”). The court determined that a reasonable person would have doubts about the ownership
of a shoebox found in the closet and added that “the police would likely not have opened the closed
shoebox if they believed it belonged to [the girlfriend]. Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely
because they believed it likely belonged to [the defendant].” Id. at 682 (quoting the district court’s
finding of fact).
213. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine).
214. Id.; cf. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
215. Contra Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42; United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir.
2006).
216. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
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The Ambiguity Approach Is Consistent with the Apparent Authority
Doctrine and Superior to the Obviousness Approach Because It Is
More Aligned with Social Norms and the Court’s Tradition of
Protecting the Home Against Unreasonable Searches

The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for caution and
restraint in applying the apparent authority doctrine.217 In Rodriguez, the
seminal case establishing the apparent authority doctrine, the Court
emphasized the importance of heightened scrutiny in apparent authority
cases.218 This preference for a limited application is also evident in the
doctrine itself: police reliance on third party consent is valid under the
apparent authority doctrine only if it is reasonable.219 Because the
standard based approaches used by the circuit courts are an extension of
the apparent authority doctrine, these approaches should, at a minimum,
subject police conduct to the same level of scrutiny as the apparent
authority doctrine. At present, only the ambiguity approach produces
results consistent with the apparent authority doctrine. By limiting
searches to containers that clearly and unambiguously fall within the
scope of authority, the ambiguity approach is consistent the Rodriguez
Court’s emphasis on restricting searches to areas where an officer
reasonably believes actual authority exists.220 In contrast, the
obviousness approach permits officers to search containers even where it
is unreasonable to believe actual authority exists.221

217. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89 (“[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law
enforcement officers may always accept a person’s invitation to enter premises. Even when the
invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding
circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act
upon it without further inquiry. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and
seizure, determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard: would the
facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’”
that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists.”) (citation omitted).
218. See id. (explaining that police need to be cautious even when the consenting party has
explicitly asserted authority).
219. Id.
220. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 185–86.
221. See supra section IV.A.
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The Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ Ambiguity Approach to the Apparent
Authority Doctrine Is Consistent with the Principles Expressed in
Rodriguez

The ambiguity approach is the most consistent with the apparent
authority doctrine: if there is ambiguity regarding ownership, it is not
reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe the consenting party
has ownership of the item.222 The ambiguity approach subjects police
conduct to the same level of constraint as the apparent authority
doctrine.223 The apparent authority doctrine requires that an officer have
a reasonable belief that the consenting party has authority over the area
to be searched;224 the ambiguity approach explains that an officer cannot
reasonably believe a party has authority if there are circumstances that
raise uncertainty or ambiguity about ownership.225 Thus, the ambiguity
approach does not alter the apparent authority doctrine, it merely uses
different language to explain the same concept.
The Sixth and D.C. Circuit Courts’ analysis in Taylor and Peyton
recognize the ambiguity approach as an extension of the apparent
authority doctrine.226 In Taylor, the Sixth Circuit held that the presence
of men’s clothing in a spare bedroom made ownership over the men’s
shoebox ambiguous.227 This ambiguity made it impossible for the
officers to reasonably believe that the men’s shoebox belonged to
Sabrina Arnett, the woman who consented to the search. In the language
of Rodriguez, the court therefore limited the scope of the search to only
those areas in which it was reasonable to believe Arnett had authority.
The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in Peyton is also consistent with the
apparent authority doctrine as expressed in Rodriguez.228 As the court
noted, “it was not reasonable for the police to believe that Hicks shared
use of the closed shoebox” given her “clear statement that there was an
area of the room that was not hers.”229 Even without Ms. Hicks’s
222. See, e.g., Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54.
223. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine); Peyton,
745 F.3d 553–54 (recognizing that an officer’s reasonable belief cannot survive when facts are
introduced making ownership of an item ambiguous).
224. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine).
225. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54.
226. See id. (rooting its analysis in the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the consenting
party had actual authority); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010)
(same).
227. Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82.
228. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86.
229. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 554.
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statement, there was likely enough ambiguity to trigger a duty for the
police to inquire: “They knew that Hicks and Peyton both lived in the
small apartment, and they were thus on notice that some spaces in the
apartment might be used exclusively by Peyton.”230 Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person would have serious doubts as to
whether the grandmother, Hicks, had authority over all containers next
to the second bed.231 By applying the ambiguity approach, the Sixth
Circuit in Taylor reached a conclusion that is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s expression of the apparent authority doctrine in
Rodriguez.232
Regardless of whether the court asks if ownership is ambiguous or if
it is reasonable for officers to believe Hicks had authority, the
conclusion will be the same, because both standards examine police
behavior with the same level of scrutiny.233 If the Court determines that
ownership of a container is ambiguous, it essentially holds that a
reasonable officer should have doubts about Hicks’ actual authority over
the container. Those doubts, in turn, make it unreasonable for an officer
to rely on Hicks’ consent. Courts applying the ambiguity approach
should always reach a conclusion consistent with the apparent authority
doctrine because both tests are tethered to an officer’s reasonable belief
about actual authority.234
In contrast, the obviousness approach permits a far less searching
inquiry, one that is not tethered to an officer’s reasonable belief.235 The
obviousness approach requires only that police confine their search
when a container obviously does not belong to the consenting party.236
Case law demonstrates that to obviously belong to another party the
container must have exterior markings linking it to another person or the
police must see another person carrying the item.237 This is an extremely

230. See id. at 553.
231. Id. at 554.
232. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86.
233. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (applying the ambiguity approach); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 185–86 (applying the apparent authority doctrine).
234. See United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[A]pparent authority
cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the searching officers do not take
steps to resolve the ambiguity.”).
235. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the
obviousness approach); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (applying the apparent authority
doctrine).
236. See Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (applying the obviousness approach).
237. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (“No officer ever saw Snype
carrying the knapsack or red plastic bag. No marks on the bags linked them to him.”); Melgar, 227
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relaxed standard—it permits officers to conduct searches in the face of
doubts and uncertainty as long as officers do not disregard blatant
evidence discounting authority.238 Consider the potential outcome of
Peyton had it been decided under the obviousness standard: despite
Hicks’ warning that she shared a space with Peyton, the officers’ search
of Peyton’s belongings would have been permissible because the items
did not obviously belong to Peyton. The items were not labeled, and the
police did not see Peyton holding them.239 As this hypothetical
illustrates, the obviousness approach permits officers to search
containers even when doing so is inconsistent with the reasonable belief
standard at the heart of the apparent authority doctrine.
2.

The Ambiguity Approach Is Superior to the Obviousness Approach
Because It Conforms to Social Norms and the Court’s Tradition of
Protecting Privacy in the Home.

The ambiguity approach is superior to the obviousness approach
because it provides stronger protections to individuals in their homes.240
According to the Supreme Court, “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”241 The
language of the Fourth Amendment creates a broad range of protections
for individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”242 but the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures is
most strictly applied in situations where a government official searches a
home.243
F.3d at 1041–42 (“[T]here were no exterior markings on the purse that should have alerted them to
the fact that it belonged to another person.”).
238. See supra section IV.A (demonstrating how the obviousness approach is not consistent with
the apparent authority doctrine).
239. See supra note 237 and surrounding text (examining the obviousness standard); United
States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
240. Cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54
(protecting the absent co-tenant’s right to be free from an unreasonable warrantless search).
241. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
243. See City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. 2d 475, 483, 408 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1965), rev’d, 387
U.S. 541 (1967) (“The requirements of the Fourth Amendment receive their strictest application
when a dwelling house is involved in a search.”) (quoting REX D. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES 8 (1964)). See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that
warrantless use of heat-imaging technology was an unlawful search of a home); Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (upholding the right of overnight guests to challenge the constitutionality
of a warrantless entry into home); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (invalidating entry into
home at night and without a warrant to arrest individual for driving while intoxicated absent more
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As discussed in section III.A, the Court has carved out special rules
that apply to home searches, expressly granting individuals heightened
Fourth Amendment protections within their homes.244 The obviousness
approach allows law enforcement officers to rely on the consent of a
third party to search containers in a common area, even where police do
not have a reasonable belief that the third party has the proper
authority.245 Thus, the obviousness approach runs counter to the
Supreme Court’s goals of protecting privacy rights in the home. In
contrast, the ambiguity approach, which requires officers to inquire
before searching a container if there is any degree of ambiguity over the
ownership of items, is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent
expressing heightened Fourth Amendment protections in the home.246
In addition to tracking Supreme Court precedent, the ambiguity
approach is superior to the obviousness approach because it is more
closely aligned with modern privacy expectations. In the context of
shared living spaces, modern social expectations require that law
enforcement officers ask questions before searching any container in a
common area, because police should not assume that open-ended
consent extends to all containers.247 As the D.C. Circuit explained in
Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Construction Co.,248 “[w]hile authority to consent
to search of a common area extends to most objects in plain view, it does
not automatically extend to the interiors of every enclosed space within
the area.”249
Imagine a college student, Greg, living in a four-bedroom apartment
with a group of friends. One day, Greg leaves his backpack on the couch
in the living room, expecting that his roommates will not go through the
backpack while he is gone. After all, it is a common understanding
among the roommates that nobody has permission to look inside the
backpack of an absent roommate—even if the roommates are all in the
common area together.250 While Greg is gone, the police knock on the
significant exigent circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (refusing to extend
search incident to a lawful arrest to include warrantless search of defendant’s entire house).
244. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–18 (2013); Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 35–40.
245. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006).
246. Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18.
247. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
248. 746 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
249. Id. at 901–02; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A homeowner’s consent to a search of the
home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed object inside the home.”).
250. Cf. Donovan, 746 F.2d at 901–02.
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door and ask one of Greg’s roommates if they can search the apartment.
Greg’s roommate does not have permission to go through Greg’s
backpack, so it follows naturally that he cannot consent to a search of
Greg’s backpack.251 However, under the obviousness approach, the
police will assume that he has authority over the backpack as long as it
does not have exterior markings linking it to Greg.252
The obviousness approach allows police officers to exploit a
judicially created loophole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
behave in ways that offend widely shared beliefs about privacy and
housemate relationships. Although the ambiguity approach is more
closely aligned with modern social expectations and Supreme Court
precedent than the obviousness approach, it still leaves open the
possibility that the police will search an absent tenant’s container
without his consent. Thus, the Court should adopt a bright-line rule
requiring police to ensure that actual authority exists before searching
containers in the home.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT A BRIGHT-LINE
RULE REQUIRING LAW ENFORCEMENT TO INQUIRE
BEFORE SEARCHING ANY CONTAINER IN A
COMMON AREA

The standard-based approaches developed by the circuit courts should
be overruled in favor of a bright-line rule requiring the police to ask
questions before searching any container in a shared living space.253
Trends in cohabitation and modern social expectations warrant revisiting
the apparent authority doctrine.254 There has been a sharp increase in the
percentage of unmarried, non-partner roommates sharing a home,255 and,
at the same time, there are more adults living with their parents than in
251. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 552 (“The fact that a person has common authority over a house, an
apartment, or a particular room, does not mean that she can authorize a search of anything and
everything within that area.”).
252. Cf. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar,
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
253. Cf. Weiber, supra note 97 (advocating for a test that “would ask whether a person actually
has express or implied common authority over the premises and is thus able to consent to a search
of the premises”). Weiber calls this test the “common authority in fact” test. Id. He contends that
“[t]he test would prevent a defendant’s right to security in his home or property from being violated
without some notice, and would protect a third party’s interest in shared property from being
imposed upon by a criminal co-inhabitant” and that it “would not significantly reduce law
enforcement effectiveness.” Id. at 641.
254. See Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112.
255. Salama, supra note 7.
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any time in recent history.256 It is now common for Americans to live
with one or more roommates, with the percentage of adults living with
roommates increasing from just over 25% in 2000 to 32% in 2012.257 In
light of this significant increase in the percentage of adults living with
roommates, the Supreme Court should introduce a bright-line rule
requiring law enforcement to inquire about actual authority before
searching any container in a common area.258 “[T]his test avoids the
hazards of the reasonableness test by allowing only a party who has
actual or implied shared authority over the premises to consent to a
search.”259 It would also improve judicial economy, lower the burden on
law enforcement to make legal determinations on the spot, and eliminate
the incentive for law enforcement to ask fewer questions.260
A.

The Recommended Bright-Line Approach Would Allow the
Supreme Court to Protect Privacy Rights Better than the Ambiguity
Approach and Bring the Law into Conformity with Social Norms

The ambiguity approach is the most consistent with the Court’s
articulation of the apparent authority doctrine in Rodriguez, but it still
opens the door for a co-tenant to inadvertently consent to a search of
items that do not belong to her. The practical effect of the standardbased approaches, like the ambiguity and obviousness approaches, is the
creation of a strong incentive for police to ask for consent only once,

256. See Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112.
257. Salama, supra note 7.
258. Cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1169 n.4 (9th Cir.
2003) (“By staying in a shared house, one does not assume the risk that a housemate will snoop
under one’s bed, much less permit others to do so.”).
259. Weiber, supra note 97, at 636.
260. See id. at 620. (“The Supreme Court’s rule tends to discourage government agents from
conducting an extensive investigation of the facts before entering property.”); George E. Dix,
Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave’s Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207,
229 (1993) (“[T]he bright line nature of the rule permits easier judicial application.”); Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good
Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 320–33 (1982) (addressing the many advantages to bright-line
rules). In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has sometimes preferred bright-line rules to
provide clear boundaries for individuals to know the scope of their rights and for law enforcement
officers to know the scope of their authority. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973) (creating a bright-line rule that officers may search an arrestee incident to every lawful arrest
without considering the likelihood of finding evidence or a weapon); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 50–52 (1970) (creating a bright-line rule that police may search an automobile without a
warrant as long as there is probable cause).
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because open-ended consent grants an incredibly broad scope.261 This
makes it simpler for the officers to do their job but incentivizes officers
to ask fewer questions and rely on incomplete information.262
Under the ambiguity approach, law enforcement can obtain openended consent from someone who appears to live at an apartment and
then search any items over which ownership is not ambiguous.263 But
just because ownership over an item is not ambiguous does not mean
that it definitely belongs to the consenting party—many roommates
could have similar taste in clothes or similar types of backpacks that
would not alert an officer to ownership by another party. The ambiguity
approach protects absent tenants from unreasonable searches when the
item raises uncertainty in the officer’s mind, but it does not protect
absent tenants from unreasonable government searches when the item is
plain and does not raise suspicion as to ownership.
The proposed bright-line approach would protect privacy in the home
but would go beyond the ambiguity approach used in Peyton, Taylor,
and Purcell by requiring law enforcement officers to inquire before
searching any container in a common area inside a home. Under this
rule, absent co-tenants are protected from unreasonable searches
regardless of whether a police officer believes that an item could
reasonably belong to the consenting co-tenant. It requires the police to
ensure that the consenting co-tenant has actual authority before
searching closed containers. This bright-line approach reflects modern
attitudes about cohabitation because it acknowledges that co-tenants do
not have joint authority over every container in the residence.264
B.

A Bright-Line Rule Offers Valuable Benefits to Law Enforcement,
Lawyers, and Judges

Modern constitutional criminal procedure prefers bright-line
categorical rules that are “easily administrable” by officers in the

261. Cf. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar,
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000).
262. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 126–27 (where officers searched the knapsack found in the bedroom
where Snype was arrested, but avoided asking any questions that would reveal the fact that the
knapsack belonged to Snype and not the woman who consented to the search); Melgar, 227 F.3d at
1039–40 (where officers, in a room with multiple women, searched a purse without asking any
questions that would reveal the true owner of the purse).
263. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42.
264. Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Construction Co., 746 F.2d 894, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“While
authority to consent to search of a common area extends to most objects in plain view, it does not
automatically extend to the interiors of every enclosed space within the area.”).
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field.265 The term “bright-line” has been used primarily in Fourth
Amendment discourse to describe “‘standardized procedures’ . . . which
may ‘be applied to all cases of a certain type, regardless of particular
factual variations.’”266 “The advocates of bright-line rules essentially
believe that the rules provide easy to follow guidelines for law
enforcement, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges alike.”267 Brightline rules have several alluring features: “they are more easily
administrable by officers” because they offer “simplified administration,
predictability, and the diminution of the need for on-the-spot judgment
calls that may be colored by subjective differences between officers.”268
Professor Wayne R. LaFave “has been the most outspoken advocate for
the adoption of bright-line rules in criminal procedure,” 269 describing the
advantage of a bright-line rule in terms of probability that an officer
applying the rule will reach the correct conclusion:
And thus, as between a complicated rule which in a theoretical
sense produces the desired result 100% of the time, but which
well-intentioned police could be expected to apply correctly in
only 75% of the cases, and a readily understood and easily
applied rule which would bring about the theoretically correct
conclusion 90% of the time, the latter is to be preferred over the
former.270
Furthermore, bright-line rules allow “easier judicial application,”
reducing “the time and effort spent by judges, lawyers, and litigants
administering the legal requirement and maximiz[ing] consistent and
thus ‘fair’ application of the rule.”271
In several Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has utilized bright-line
rules.272 The most prominent of such cases is the landmark decision
265. Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1407, 1464–65 (2011).
266. LaFave, supra note 260, at 322–23.
267. Andrew McLetchie, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence:
Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s Bright-Line Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 228 (2001). See also Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of
the Law of Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that
bright-line rules facilitate the application of the law).
268. Fan, supra note 265, at 1465.
269. McLetchie, supra note 260, at 227.
270. LaFave, supra note 260, at 321.
271. Dix, supra note 260, at 229.
272. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453–55 (1971) (explaining that the basic
constitutional rule is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).
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Mapp v. Ohio273 extending the federal exclusionary rule to state court
proceedings.274 In Mapp, a woman was charged for possessing obscene
materials, but the Court suppressed the evidence because the police
lacked probable cause to search for such materials in her apartment.275
The exclusionary rule developed in Mapp provides that any evidence
obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible as
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant.276 Another example
of a bright-line Supreme Court holding is found in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,277 where the Court held that the warrantless search and
seizure of an unoccupied car was a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment.278
Perhaps the most famous example of a judicially mandated bright-line
rule in criminal procedure comes from Miranda v. Arizona.279 In
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that statements made by the suspect
during custodial interrogation are admissible at trial only if
the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to
consult with an attorney, the right against self-incrimination, and that the
defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived
them.280 These rights came to be known as the Miranda rights and
became part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were
informed of their constitutional rights.281 Miranda fits within and yet
stands out as a particularly strong example of bright-line rules within
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

273. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
274. See id. at 657.
275. See id. at 654–55.
276. Id.
277. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
278. See id. at 453–55.
279. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
280. See id. at 478–79.
281. See DANIEL T. GILLESPIE, MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 18:121 (2d ed. 2017) (describing the
rights as the “Miranda rights” and explaining their significance).
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The Minimal Burden of Asking Clarifying Questions Should Be
Borne by Law Enforcement Officers Because They Are WellTrained and Well-Situated to Protect the Rights of Absent Parties

The burden of asking clarifying questions should be placed on the
party best situated to bear this responsibility—the government.282 As the
Rodriguez Court put it, “[t]he burden of establishing . . . common
authority [over property] rests upon the State.”283 While there are
potential objections to this approach, the objections do not outweigh the
numerous advantages outlined in this Comment.284 Training police to
ask questions in every situation increases the chance that all evidence
seized will be admissible in court.285 Also, the burden of asking these
questions is quite small and does not outweigh the value of protecting
criminal defendants’ rights.286 In fact, the questions that officers would
be asking under a bright-line approach would be similar to the warnings
that police are required to provide under Miranda in the context of
custodial interrogations.287
One potential objection to this approach is that it would be laborious
for law enforcement to implement because officers would be burdened
with the duty to inquire about potentially hundreds of containers in a
home.288 This rule only requires that officers, when confronted with a
closed container, ask if it belongs to the person who consented to the

282. See DOJ PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 139, at 6 (“[T]he police, by virtue of the
authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility for the outcome of encounters
with citizens.”).
283. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
284. See supra Part IV.
285. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). Asking clarifying questions would help
reduce the amount of evidence excluded under the exclusionary rule because officers would be less
likely to seize evidence that is “off-limits” if they had more information about the evidence they
were seizing.
286. See Weiber, supra note 97, at 638 (“Even though the test would slow down law enforcement
activities, this is a relatively small price to pay for the added protection to criminal defendants’
rights which the test provides.”); id. at 605 (“This test would require that a person who consents to
the search actually have common authority over the place or item searched. . . . Additionally, such a
test would not significantly impede law enforcement efforts.”); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 478–79 (1966). The burden of asking clarifying questions is seemingly lower than the burden
of reading a person her Miranda rights; Miranda rights consist of a paragraph of information
whereas asking a question can be done in a single short sentence, such as “Is this your backpack?”
287. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
288. See Frank J. Stretz, An Objective Solution to an Ambiguous Problem: Determining the
Ownership of Closed Containers During a Consensual Search, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 203, 220–21
(2011).
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search. Complying with this rule would be as simple as asking, “is this
your shoebox?” or “do you use these drawers?”289
The burden to clarify the scope of the search should be on the
government, rather than the consenting party, because the burden of
establishing the existence of apparent authority rests on the
government.290 After all, the government is trying to circumvent the
warrant requirement by asking for consent to conduct a search.291 Thus,
it follows that the police should also bear the burden of clarifying the
scope of an individual’s open-ended consent when the police seek to
search a closed container.292
Putting the burden on individuals to clarify the scope of their consent
is unreasonable because unlike the police, individuals do not have
training on Fourth Amendment consent searches,293 and individuals do
not have an incentive to provide detailed clarifications without
prompting.294 If consenting parties do not limit the scope of their
289. Cf. United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Agent Rolfsen moved
toward the duffel bags by the door and pointed to ‘a green brown bag’ and asked Crist ‘[i]s it this
bag?’”) (alteration in original).
290. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (“As we stated in Matlock . . . , ‘[c]ommon
authority’ rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control
for most purposes. . . .’ The burden of establishing that common authority rests upon the State.”)
(second and third alterations in original).
291. See id. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Because the sole law enforcement purpose
underlying third-party consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of securing a warrant, a
departure from the warrant requirement is not justified simply because an officer reasonably
believes a third party has consented to a search of the defendant’s home.”).
292. Cf. Marc L. Edmondson, Scope of Consent Searches: Are Police Officers and Judges
Misguided by the Objective Reasonableness Test?, 57 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1992) (“Perhaps a
more palatable and workable rule would be to break the types of consent searches into three
categories: (1) a general consent search, (2) a consent search with an expressed object, and (3) a
consent search with an expressed object that focuses on containers. Under this approach, the
specificity of the request determines the permissible scope of the search.”).
293. For instance, Seattle police officers are trained on the rules surrounding consent searches.
See SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 6.180 (updated Mar. 1,
2017), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6—-arrests-search-and-seizure/6180—-searchesgeneral [https://perma.cc/2VPC-G98M] (“Consent is valid if the third person has equal authority
over the business or residence and it can be concluded the absent person assumed the risk the
cohabitant (roommate) might permit a search.”). See also Weiber, supra note 97, at 620 (“Because
of their training and jobs, the police will naturally have a superior ability to ask questions which,
when read to the jury, will make it appear as if the police were reasonable in believing that the
consenting party had authority to allow the search. Additionally, the police will know which
questions not to ask—especially those which may reveal that a party does not have the requisite
authority to allow a search.”).
294. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (where the defendant’s
grandmother told police that the defendant kept his belongings in the living room, but did not clarify
which objects actually belonged to the defendant); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 679–80
(6th Cir. 2010) (where the tenant consented to a search but did not tell police that she lacked
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consent, then they are potentially eroding the privacy rights of their
roommates.295 The courts should not create a system that places the
burden of clarifying the scope of authority on a party that has no
incentive to properly limit consent and a high potential to erode the
rights of others.296 Instead, the courts should require the government to
clarify the scope of the consenting party’s authority because the
government is better positioned than individuals to understand Fourth
Amendment implications.297
Another potential objection to this approach is that it would make it
harder for law enforcement officers to collect evidence.298 Switching
from a standard-based approach to this bright-line rule would narrow the
scope of potentially collectible evidence.299 This is particularly true in
jurisdictions using the obviousness approach because law enforcement
will no longer be afforded the wide latitude of the illogical obviousness
standard—officers will only be able to collect evidence that falls within
the consenting party’s actual authority.300 However, this will not unfairly
constrain police officers during investigations because officers should
not knowingly obtain evidence outside the scope of the consenting
party’s authority in the first place.

authority over her male guest’s belongings in the spare bedroom); United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d
119, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000)
(where one person consented to a search but did not clarify for the police the exact items over which
he or she did not have authority).
295. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37.
296. See Weiber, supra note 97, at 626–27 (“[A] defendant cannot know that a stranger or party
in whom no common authority rests may consent to a search . . . . [A] criminal defendant has no
ability to shield his privacy interests because he cannot know when someone who lacks sufficient
authority over his property will permit a search. The relationship between a third party who lacks
authority and the defendant is, by definition, too attenuated for the defendant to recognize the risk of
a search.”); Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (where the court protected the rights of the absent co-tenant
and put the burden of clarifying the scope of consent onto the police).
297. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (“[T]he government’s burden to establish that a third party had authority to consent to a
search . . . cannot be met if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without
making further inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear
whether the property about to be searched is subject to ‘mutual use’ by the person giving consent,
‘then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry.’” (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990)) (emphasis added in Whitfield).
298. See Stretz, supra note 288, at 204 (“Such a rule would essentially freeze the legitimate
exercise of police authority, spark an inestimable amount of litigation over hairsplitting ambiguities,
and make officers unduly fearful of the unintended legal consequences lurking under every lid.”).
299. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (where officers were permitted to search anything not
obviously belonging to another party, which encompassed everything in the apartment).
300. Contra id.
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Although this bright-line rule might result in “lost” evidence, the
Fourth Amendment itself has imposed the cost.301 This situation is
closely analogous to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s comments
in his law review article concerning the exclusionary rule.302 As Justice
Stewart explained, the exclusionary rule maintains the status quo that
would have prevailed if the Fourth Amendment requirements had been
obeyed:
Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is
misdirected; it is more properly directed at the fourth
amendment itself. It is true that, as many observers have
charged, the effect of the [exclusionary] rule is to deprive the
courts of extremely relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of
the defendant. But these same critics fail to acknowledge that, in
many instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not
have been obtained had the police officer complied with the
commands of the fourth amendment in the first place.303
Because the proposed bright-line rule only requires law enforcement
officers to clarify the scope of consent, the cost of “lost” evidence is
properly credited to the Fourth Amendment itself, rather than the brightline rule.304
If exigent circumstances exist, such as an imminent risk that the
evidence would be destroyed, then the government will have an
exception to the warrant requirement and will be able to search the
container immediately.305 Thus, the only situation in which this proposed
rule would prevent law enforcement officers from getting evidence they
need would be when there are no exigent circumstances and the officers
301. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
[Fourth] Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be
lost to the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the Amendment itself that has
imposed this cost.”).
302. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392–93
(1983) (“The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. The fourth
amendment does. The inevitable result of the Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that
police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals. . . . [That] is the price the framers
anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property
against unrestrained governmental power.”).
303. Id. at 1392.
304. See id.
305. The need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recognized as a
sufficient justification for a warrantless search. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 n.6 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100
(1990).
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do not have a warrant. A container that law enforcement officers could
not search under this rule should not be viewed as “lost” evidence
because preventing the government from seizing evidence without a
warrant is the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment.306
Critics of the ambiguity approach might argue that law enforcement
officers should not be required to ask clarifying questions in this context
because they are not required to do so in other contexts. For example,
the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte307 and United States v.
Drayton308 made clear that it will rarely place a duty on law enforcement
officers to inform an individual of his right to object to a search.309
Placing a duty on law enforcement officers to clarify the ownership of
containers is different than making officers inform a suspect of her right
to object to a search.310 Bustmaonte and Drayton assert that law
enforcement officers have no duty to educate the public about the right
to object to a search.311 But placing a duty on law enforcement officers
to inquire before searching a closed container does not require officers to
306. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If nothing else, the [Fourth]
Amendment plainly operates to disable the government from gathering information and securing
evidence in certain ways. In practical terms, of course, this restriction of official power means that
some incriminating evidence inevitably will go undetected if the government obeys these
constitutional restraints. It is the loss of that evidence that is the ‘price’ our society pays for
enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.”).
307. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
308. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
309. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor
to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of
an effective consent.”) (italics in original); Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206 (“The Court has rejected in
specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse
when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”). In Bustamonte, the police
pulled over a vehicle containing six individuals for a broken headlight and license plate light.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. The driver was unable to produce a driver’s license, but one of the
passengers was able to produce one. Id. The passenger consented to a search of the vehicle, and
three stolen checks were recovered as a result. Id. Bustamonte argued that the consent was invalid.
Id. at 220–21. The Court held that the police do not have a duty to inform individuals of their right
to object to a search—the government needs to show only that voluntary consent existed. See id. at
246–49. In Drayton, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort
and interviewed passengers. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–98. Officers found bags of cocaine on two of
the passengers who consented to a search. Id. at 198–99. The passengers argued that the search was
unlawful because the police engaged in coercive behavior by boarding the bus and not informing the
passengers that they could object to a search. Id. at 199–200. The Supreme Court held that the
search was valid because there was no coercion on the part of the police—the passengers were free
to object to the search or exit the bus. See id. at 200, 206–07. The Court affirmed the holding in
Bustamonte that the police have no duty to inform individuals of their right to object to a search. Id.
at 207.
310. Cf. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246–49.
311. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206–07; Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246–49.
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educate the public about Fourth Amendment rights312—it merely
requires officers to ascertain whether the consenting party actually has
the authority to grant consent in the first place.
In sum, the Supreme Court should adopt a bright-line rule governing
third party consent searches of containers because it would maximize
protection for individuals in their homes, and bring the law into
conformity with social expectations. Such a rule is beneficial to law
enforcement, lawyers, and judges, while placing only a minimal burden
on officers.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect individuals from
unreasonable governmental intrusions into their private lives. Circuit
courts disagree as to whether law enforcement has a duty to inquire
about the extent of a consenting party’s actual authority over containers
in a common area.313 This is particularly problematic in today’s society
because millions of Americans take advantage of shared living
arrangements.314 Of the currently established approaches, the approach
taken by the D.C. Circuit in Peyton is superior because it provides more
protection to individuals than the obviousness approach at almost no
additional cost to police.315 However, to properly safeguard individuals’
Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should declare an even
more protective bright-line rule requiring officers to inquire before
searching any container in a common area.316 A bright-line approach
goes even further than the ambiguity approach in maximizing Fourth
Amendment protections; it replaces an amorphous standard with a clear
rule that is simple for law enforcement, judges, and lawyers to apply.

312. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (requiring the police to
determine the scope of open-ended consent when there is ambiguity as to ownership of the
container); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2010) (same).
313. See supra Part IV.
314. See supra Part I.
315. See supra Part IV.
316. See supra Part V.

